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The impact of cyber-attacks on publicly traded companies 
Joseph DeCoste 
This thesis explores the financial impact of cyber-attacks on publicly traded companies as 
determined by equity market investors, and attempts to identify the significant determinants of this 
impact. A hand collected sample of 313 events is analyzed using an event study methodology. The 
average (median) cumulative abnormal return when a company experiences a cyber-attack is -
0.69% (-0.37%), which translates into an average (median) $134,604,868 ($30,506,757) 
destruction of firm value. Smaller firms are hit harder than larger firms, and the number of cyber-
attacks in a trailing 30-day period is negatively related to average cumulative abnormal returns. 
Attacks on technology and telecom companies have become less frequent and less damaging, 
while attacks on Finance and Retail companies have become more frequent. Retail damages have 
become significantly worse, and Finance companies have experienced some of the most damaging 
attacks ever revealed. Hacktivism and State Sponsored attacks are relatively inexpensive to firm 
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Introduction 
 
The advent of the internet has led to a new and sophisticated channel for criminals to target 
organizations for nefarious purposes. Prior to the internet, theft of company business secrets, 
customer records, or the disruption of customer businesses generally required physical actions and 
considerable risk. Organizations could secure this limited avenue for access with proper physical 
security and information custody policies. Even now, a common way for businesses to protect their 
most treasured digital assets is by ensuring that they are not connected to the internet, limiting any 
risk to the physical realm which can more easily be protected. While keeping information 
disconnected is undeniably safer, it also robs an organization of the benefits that data connectivity 
provides. Therefore, businesses must expose potentially important and private information within 
the fast moving, constantly changing, and more sophisticated digital world, which is more difficult 
to safeguard. 
 With this in mind, it is not surprising that organizations are increasingly targeted in the 
digital environment, especially as digital usage has become more vital and integrated with 
organizational operations. Furthermore, security technology has often struggled to keep up with 
unauthorized intruders. For some perspective on the problem consider a survey on cyber-crime by 
CSI (2010) revealing that 41.1% of surveyed businesses experienced a cyber-attack in the year 
before the survey. Attacks such as the TJ MAXX data theft in 2007 resulting in 45 million stolen 
credit and debit card numbers, Heartland Payment Systems attack in 2009 compromising over 100 
million credit card numbers, and the Sony PlayStation hack in 2011 that compromised the 
information of 102 million customers, illustrate the potential scale of damage that cyber-attacks 
pose. Further evidence of the increasing frequency of cyber-attacks over time is well documented 
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in Campbell et al (2003), Hovav and D’Arcy (2003, 2004), Yayla and Hu (2011), and Shackleford 
(2012). 
 Companies have begun to acknowledge cyber-attacks as a major threat to their businesses. 
Global surveys of CEO’s conducted by PWC in 2015 and 2016 reported 61% consider cyber 
threats to be a key concern for their companies’ growth, and lists cyber security technology as one 
of the top three most important technologies for companies. However, the dilemma for companies 
transcends a simple decision of whether or not to protect themselves. Cyber-security is costly, and 
protecting more information in more sophisticated ways, and doing so dynamically, takes 
significant initial and ongoing expense. Public companies in particular have to balance this cost 
with their fiduciary duty to investors to maximize shareholder wealth. From an investor wealth 
maximization perspective, such expenditures need to be at least value-neutral for the company. 
Compared to revenue generating and brand promoting investments, cyber-security is not flashy 
and its expected net benefits are difficult to calculate. A cyber-crime study conducted in 2010 by 
CSI found that only 52% of companies reported having intrusion detection capabilities, one of the 
most basic of protections, to inform them when they have been cyber-attacked. Clearly not all 
companies see even basic protections as a worthwhile investment. 
Costs are also hard to determine for companies because the regulatory system in the US is 
a patchwork of laws covering specific data, industries, or geographical areas. Regulations deal 
primarily with notification requirements, leaving determination of actual legal liabilities to the 
courts. Some of these regulations include the HIPAA for health data, PCIDSS for the payment 
card industry, and US State notification laws (CSI, 2010). Some laws with the widest coverage are 
not specifically targeted towards cyber-security. For example, the 2002 Sarbanes-Oxley Act only 
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covers cyber-attacks indirectly, as part of more widespread requirements to report failures of 
internal controls, and items which will have a material effect on financial statements.  
 Direct data on the costs of cyber-attacks are unavailable, and are difficult to estimate when 
considering the potential effects on lost business and damaged reputations. A 2016 survey of 
managers by the Ponemon Institute estimated an average data breach cost of 4 million dollars, or 
approximately $221 per lost and stolen record in the US. A natural extension in the face of this 
paucity of direct data is to examine financial market reactions to determine the damage as 
perceived by investors. If investors punish the market values of firms’ subject to cyber-attacks, 
then the extent of this punishment provides an estimate of cyber-attack costs when determining 
optimal investment in cyber-security. Previous literature has reported mixed or weak abnormal 
returns from cyber-attack announcements using event study methodologies for small samples of 
such breaches.  
 Unlike most previous research, this study examines the effects of only cyber-attacks as 
opposed to physical and cyber intrusions. It uses a much larger set of observations over a much 
longer time period. This allows for a deeper and more powerful analysis of the role that firm and 
attack characteristics play in the market’s assessment of the costs of such attacks, and of these 
relationships over time.  
The remainder of the thesis is organized as follows: Section I reviews the previous 
literature. Section II introduces variables and develops the hypotheses. Section III describes the 
data and methodology. Section IV presents and discusses the results. Section V addresses 
robustness. Section VI concludes.  
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I. Literature Review 
 
For a sample of 43 data breaches, Campbell et al (2003) find a significant negative 
relationship between abnormal returns and privacy breaches only for the subset of breaches 
involving access to confidential information. Hovav and D’Arcy (2003) find no general market 
penalty for a sample of 23 denial of service (DoS)1 attacks, and Hovav and D’Arcy (2004) find no 
general market penalty for a sample of 186 Virus2 attacks.  
In contrast, Cavusoglu et al (2004) find that breached firms experience heavy market 
capitalization losses, while information security companies gain significant market value when 
other firms are breached. Using a larger sample of 79 breaches, Acquisti, Friedman, and Telang 
(2006) find a moderate but significantly negative market response to data breaches that is higher 
for small firms, retail firms, greater perceived attack maliciousness and number of victims. They 
note that outliers seem to drive much of the negative performance, as the median negative response 
is lower than the mean response. While these determinants are not always significant, they indicate 
that the market may not treat all attacks the same. Goel and Shawky (2014) find that a sample of 
168 data breaches between 2004 and 2008 has an average negative impact of 1% of firm market 
value. Yayla and Hu (2011) find a significant negative impact of information security events on 
firm value. Firms with DoS attacks are punished most, ecommerce firms experience more 
damaging breaches, and these market reactions have generally softened over time.  
 Using a sample of 121 data breaches from 1995-2007, Gordon, Loeb, and Zhou (2011) find 
that the impact of breaches was larger before 2001 than after. They also find that breaches affecting 
                                                          
1 Denial of Service attacks involve a large number of requests to servers with the purpose of 
overwhelming and disrupting normal operations of the servers. This can prevent websites from working, 
and companies from accessing important information on servers. 
2 Virus attacks install rogue computer programs into a computer system, disrupting their operation. 
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the availability of a business’s services are more damaging than those related to business integrity 
or data confidentiality. 
 Finally, Chai, Kim and Rao (2011) report a significantly positive abnormal return impact 
of security investment announcements. The abnormal returns became stronger after the passing of 
the Sarbanes-Oxley act in 2002, which introduced more stringent requirements on companies to 
keep private information safe. 
 Of these nine studies, only Cavusoglu et al (2004) focus on cyber-attacks. The others deal 
with very specific types of attacks (Hovav and D’Arcy, 2003, 2004) or more general data security 
breaches of which cyber-attacks are a specific subset. Other attacks in these studies include 
physical breaches such as lost laptops and hard drives with customer data, and employee data theft. 
While previous empirical results have been mixed, they do generally support the idea that cyber-
attacks are damaging events to firms from the perspective of equity investors.  
II. Hypotheses 
 
A. Overall effect of cyber-attacks on publicly traded companies  
 Financial damage may be expected from cyber-attacks for many reasons, some of which 
have already been explained above. Valuable customer or proprietary information may be lost, 
legal liabilities may be incurred, a company’s reputation may be damaged, and services may be 
disrupted. However, to the extent that a cyber-attack might motivate positive change within a 
company, there could be some positive effects which potentially outweigh the negative effects. 
An example might be a minor systems intrusion compromising a small amount of harmless 
information, motivating a complete upgrade of a company’s information security system. The 
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market may decide that the reduced risk of a future catastrophic loss of valuable information 
outweighs the cost of the intrusion itself and react positively in such a case.  
B. Effect of cyber-attacks by attack characteristics  
 It is interesting to test if subgroups of attacks with specific characteristics exhibit 
significantly different damage. The characteristics studied for each attack, the specific effect they 
could have on cyber-attack damage, and any potential differences between different subgroups is 
outlined below. 
B.1. Attack Category 
 Attack categories are set as disrupt, information, or integrity. Disrupt attacks may cause 
direct losses, such as an online store unable to sell products because their website is offline, or 
indirect losses as frustrated customers seek other companies to do business with in the future. 
Disrupt attacks may also harm productivity by making important online resources unavailable to 
employees, or simply cause reputational harm by showing that a company is unable to protect 
itself. 
Information attacks are those which seek to access private information. They may result 
in lost business as consumers no longer trust the company to keep their data safe and either seek 
competitor services, or reduce their use of the service in general; to the detriment of the industry 
as a whole. Legal liability is also likely from information attacks as most companies are subject 
to regulation and have a responsibility to protect customer data. If they fail to follow these 
regulations or fail to protect data, they are likely to face fines and lawsuits. Companies may also 
lose competitive advantages depending on what is lost. Proprietary information about products, 
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services, or business plans may end up in the hands of competitors. Lost customer information 
may also identify promising prospective clients for competitors to approach. 
Integrity attacks primarily put reputation at risk, as they include website defacements and 
social media account hijackings. These defacements and hijackings are often used to spread 
controversial messages, which could be falsely attributed to the company by the public if they do 
not realize that an attack has taken place. Customers who realize that these are attacks may be 
forgiving. Consumer trust may also be damaged in certain integrity attacks. There have been 
cases where company websites have been attacked and subverted to infect the computers of those 
who visit with malicious viruses. This could make customers hesitant to use the company’s 
online services in the future. 
B.2. Attack type 
Attack types are classified as either hacktivism, state sponsored, or cybercrime. 
Hacktivism attacks are simply a form of activism in the cyber realm. They often take the form of 
denial of service attacks on a company’s website to punish them for a perceived wrong or to 
raise awareness about the social or political cause of the hacker.  
Attacks which are speculated to be sponsored by a specific nation are classified as state 
sponsored. However, it is generally impossible to authenticate these claims as nations almost 
universally deny any involvement. Given the resources at the disposal of nations, such attacks 
may be particularly sophisticated and damaging. However, unlike basic criminal attacks motives 
may not be to seek financial gain or cause economic damage and some of these attacks may have 
unexpected positive effects for companies by galvanizing patriotic consumers behind them and 
generating public support and goodwill.  
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Those attacks which are not hacktivism or state sponsored are classified as cybercrime, 
and comprise the majority of attacks. There are many motivations for such attacks. Some are less 
malicious, and are simply undertaken to expose security weaknesses and force companies to 
respond with increased security. Some seem to be done simply to cause havoc, seeking no real 
gain other than notoriety. Others are quite clearly targeted for financial gain. 
B.3. Responsibility 
 Attacks are further classified into two groups depending on who is actually hacked. Tasks 
such as website hosting and management, consumer data management, and payment processing 
are often outsourced to specialized services providers. Thus, a large share of the responsibility 
for stopping an attack on a corporate website, or protecting consumer data, often falls on a third-
party. In such cases damages may be mitigated, as fault and legal liability is shared. Attacks with 
first party blame may therefore be more damaging than those with third or shared party blame. 
B.4. Types of information lost  
 When a company discloses an information breach, it generally announces what 
information is lost which allows for a classification of the breach by account, identity, payment, 
and proprietary information.  
Account information includes email addresses, log-in names, passwords, addresses, and 
phone numbers which are generally less sensitive or already semi-public. These types of attacks 
may have been more serious in the early years of email service. Lost email addresses are 
generally used to send unsolicited or malicious emails to unsuspecting recipients. These attacks 
are now familiar and easily avoided by those who use email services and many are identified and 
blocked by email filters. The danger of attacks involving login names and passwords may be 
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accentuated when those same credentials are used on many different accounts. These risks can be 
mitigated by following best practices and using different passwords and usernames for different 
accounts. 
Identity information is considered to be more sensitive and private, and can lead to 
identity theft that can result in significant damage for the victim. This information includes social 
security numbers, and employment, health or tax records. Customer perceptions of the risk and 
cost of identity theft also impacts how they react, and thus the expected cost of these attacks to 
those responsible for ensuring the safety of the breached data.  
Payment information consists of credit card, debit card, or bank account numbers and 
passwords. The loss of this information leads to a risk of fraud and direct financial loss by 
consumers. Trust and security is incredibly important in the payment system, and if consumers 
do not feel safe then damage may be felt as they seek alternate providers or transact less. 
Proprietary information includes internal company communications, documents, business 
plans, product information, and source code. This has the potential to compromise products or 
decrease competitive advantage. 
B.6. First or subsequent hack 
 If a company has never been hacked, they may be less likely to have proper protections in 
place to prevent or mitigate damages. Attacks should draw management attention to such 
deficiencies and motivate improvements to cyber security, mitigating the effects of subsequent 
attacks. Conversely, consumers may be more forgiving of a “first offense”, but grow increasingly 
frustrated by additional attacks. 
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B.7. Firm Industry 
Industry classification begins by grouping each event by firm into a Fama-French 12 
industry class by HSICCD number as reported in CRSP. Any classifications with less than 20 
observations are condensed. Firms in class 12 (industry “other”) are moved if they clearly fit 
better in another industry grouping. For example, Visa and MasterCard SIC codes place them in 
the “other” category at times, and are moved into the Finance industry grouping to best reflect 
the nature of the attack being on the financial system. The firms remaining in the “other” 
category include airlines, courier services, and hotels, amongst others. 
We expect attacks on the Finance industry to be damaging if consumers value trust and 
security highly for these companies, and if the wealth of information held by such firms is 
vulnerable to unauthorized access. Technology companies might also be significantly affected 
since many rely on the internet as a core part of their business. Studies by Cavusoglu et al (2004) 
and Yayla and Hu (2011) indicate such for these two industries. Research by Acquisiti, 
Friedman, and Telang (2006) also finds that Retail companies are more negatively affected by 
attacks than other firms.  
B.8. Time 
 To detect changes in cyber-attack damages over time, the sample is split into two sub-
periods, 1997 to 2007 and 2008 to 2015, where the first sub period coincides with the last year 
examined by most previous studies and precedes the recent financial crisis. This allows for an 
examination of the changes in the category of attacks, motivations of attackers, and types of 
companies being targeted. Of specific interest is evaluating if the impact of attacks has weakened 
over time as noted by Gordon, Loeb, and Zhou (2011) and Yayla and Hu (2011). Time may also 
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reveal changes in the types of attacks and firms being targeted, and the success or failure of 
companies to respond to early threats. 
C. Additional Contingencies  
 The effect of a cyber-attack may also be influenced by other circumstances. Media and 
investor attention may be heightened if many attacks have recently occurred, so the number of 
trailing events in the previous 30 days and the number of days passed since the last attack in the 
sample are used as a proxy for this effect. The damage associated with information attacks may 
depend on the number of records lost so this is also tested. The Ponemon (2016) survey of 
company managers reports that there is indeed a higher cost to a breach if more records are lost. 
If this increase in cost is significant, then we would expect to see those attacks with larger 
numbers of records compromised being punished more by investors. 
Previous research by Cavusoglu et al (2004) and Acquisti, Friedman, and Telang (2006) 
find that smaller firms are impacted more by cyber-attacks than larger firms.  Since legal costs 
have a fixed component, they have a disproportionate impact on smaller firms which may also 
lack the resources to identity and protect themselves as well as larger firms. 
III. Data and Methodology 
A. Data 
 A total of 350 events are collected over the 1997-2015 period from news articles obtained 
through both Factiva and Google News using a keyword search.3 The event date is recorded as 
the date of the first media report announcing the attack, with either management confirmation or 
other credible evidence in support. Unsubstantiated rumours are excluded. The event is attributed 
                                                          
3 Keywords included in the search: denial of service, ddos, dos, attack, cyber, hack, hacked, hacker, 
breach, virus, compromise, company, corporation. 
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to the next trading day if the report is released on a weekend or holiday or the time of publication 
is after the market close. Other information collected from the news articles includes attack 
category, attacker type, and whether a third party is at fault. For events involving information 
loss, the nature of that information and number of records compromised is also recorded when 
available. 
Events are then excluded if they have another major confounding event within the event 
period [-1, 1] or if return data does not exist for the entire estimation period around the event. 
Some confounding events in the sample include earnings reports, earning guidance, and analyst 
ratings changes. A subsample excluding events during recessions is also analyzed given the 
finding by Kacperczyk, Van Nieuwerburgh and Veldkamp (2016) that investor attention may be 
focused on aggregate shocks as opposed to idiosyncratic shocks during recessions. The two 
recession periods as determined by the NBER are March 2001 to November 2001 and December 
2007 to June 2009. As in Gordon, Loeb, and Zhou (2011), events are excluded not only if the 
event date falls in the recession period, but also if their estimation windows [-130, 130] overlap 
these recession periods, as estimates during high volatility recession periods may be unreliable. 
Table I provides details of sample size and attrition due to these exclusions. 
 This event data is merged with daily return and firm characteristic data available from 
CRSP. To conduct estimation and calculation of expected returns, returns on factor portfolios are 
used from WRDS and Ken French’s data library (French, 2017). 
 Table 2 provides information on the number of attacks categorized by characteristic and 
industry for the entire sample, and the sub-periods of 1997 to 2007 and 2008 to 2015, and the 
recession period. Average and median firm size, number of unique firms targeted, and average 
number of attacks per firm are reported. 
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B. Methodology 
 The first step in determining how a cyber-attack affects stock returns on a given event 
day is to calculate the abnormal return (AR) due to the event. We do this by estimating the 
following regression for every event i using a 260 trading day window [-130, 130] centered on 
the event date 0: 
𝑅𝑖𝑡 =  𝛼𝑖 + ∑ 𝛽𝑖𝑗𝐹𝑗𝑡 + ∑ 𝛾𝑖𝜏𝐷𝜏
1
𝑇=−1 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡      (1) 
Where 𝑅𝑖𝑡 is the excess return over the daily return on the one month treasury bill on the security 
for event i on day t;  𝐹𝑗𝑡 are the excess returns on the market (𝑀𝐾𝑇𝑅𝐹), and the raw returns on 
the size (𝑆𝑀𝐵), value (𝐻𝑀𝐿), profitability(𝑅𝑀𝑊), and investment (𝐶𝑀𝐴) risk factors (Fama 
and French, 2015) for day t, DT is a dummy variable equal to one on day τ in the event window [-
1, 1], and zero otherwise;  and 𝜀𝑖𝑡 is the error term. The estimated gamma represents the 
abnormal return on each event day τ as in Kryzanowski and Zhang (2013).  
 The 3-day event window centred on the event date 0 accounts for potential leakage of 
news before public announcements, for ambiguity in the time of day a news article is actually 
received by the public, and slight delay in the information release being reflected in market 
prices. We then sum the abnormal returns in the event window [-1, 1] to obtain a cumulative 
abnormal return (CAR) for that event. We test if the mean CAR is statistically different than zero 
using a t-test where the standard error of the cross section of CARs deals with event-induced 
variability (Campbell, Lo, and MacKinley, 1997). Medians are also examined using a sign test. 
  We use a simple two sample t-test for independent samples to examine if the mean CAR 
differ for various subsamples based on various attack characteristics. Inferences are made 
assuming equal or unequal variances based on the results of a folded F-test for equality of 
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variance. A Wilcoxon Rank Sum test is used to test median differences between the two samples. 
(Hollander, Wolfe, and Chicken, 2013). We also check normality of the subsamples using 
Shapiro-Wilks tests. When normality is rejected, t-tests of mean differences may not be reliable, 
and median differences should be given more importance. 
To identify significant determinants of the CAR, we run a cross sectional regression to 
test the relationship between CAR and various potential determinants such as time passed since 
the last cyber-attack, firm size, number of records lost for information attacks, and number of 
trailing events. Parameter estimates are tested using heteroscedasticity consistent standard errors 
as recommended in Long and Ervin (2000), and using M-estimate robust regressions (Huber, 
1973). We also conduct F-tests to determine equality of our regression coefficients as a further 
way to test for significant differences in CAR by attack characteristic and industry. 
IV. Results and Discussion 
 
A. Overall effect of cyber-attacks 
 Results in Table (3) show that cyber-attacks result in a small but significant negative 
mean and median CAR. The mean damage is -0.69% and the median damage is -0.37%. This 
effect is clearly concentrated on the event day. In terms of firm value, the mean (median) change 
in market capitalization in the face of a cyber-attack is $134,604,868 ($30,506,757). Clearly 
attacks are damaging events, and the worst attacks especially so. 
 Despite trends in earlier research by Gordon, Loeb, and Zhou (2011) and Yayla and Hu 
(2011) which showed the significance of cyber-attacks declining, results in Table (6) show no 
significant change in the mean or median CAR between the 1997-2007 and 2008-2015 sub-
periods, and CARs in both periods are similar (Online appendix C.1 and C.2) 
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B. Effect of cyber-attacks by attack category 
 Results in Table (4) show that disrupt attacks result in a significant mean CAR and 
marginally insignificant median CAR. This indicates that most disrupt attacks are minor, but that 
they are capable of causing real damage. Information attacks on the other hand result in both 
significant mean and median CAR. This highlights the particular importance of data security for 
IT managers. Integrity attacks, primarily website defacements and social media account hacks, 
are highly insignificant. Perhaps unsurprisingly, these attacks are considered largely immaterial 
by investors. 
 While there are some clear mean and median differences between these attack categories, 
as shown in Table (5), there is little evidence of a statistical difference between them. Analysis in 
Table (6) also shows that mean and median CARs have not changed significantly over time for 
these attack categories. 
 While damage may not have changed, frequency has (Table 2). Disrupt attacks are much 
less frequent after 2007, likely due to a decrease in the use of widespread and disruptive virus 
attacks by hackers. Information and integrity attacks are much more frequent after 2007, and 
point to a change in motives amongst attackers. Information can be stolen for profit, while 
integrity attacks can be used to spread messages to wider audiences. 
 C. Effect of cyber-attacks by attack type 
 Table (4) reveals that damaging attacks are generally those that are criminally motivated. 
Hacktivism attacks are clearly not damaging based on investor perceptions. As with the case of 
integrity attacks, the purpose may be to raise awareness for a cause more than to cause damage. 
State Sponsored attacks also do not cause significant damage based on our sample. However, the 
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mean CAR is only marginally insignificant despite a relatively small sample, indicating that the 
threat should not be dismissed lightly.  
 Hacktivism attacks exhibit much less severe mean and median CARs than other attacks, 
but this difference is statistically weak (Table 5). While the difference in mean CARs is 
marginally significant, the test may be unreliable due to non-normality in the sample. The result 
is not robust to the exclusion of recession period events, and median differences are insignificant.  
 Hacktivism and State Sponsored attacks are almost non-existent before 2007 (Table 2). 
Their more recent introduction points to continual change in the challenges faced by companies 
to keep themselves safe in the cyber world. 
D. Effect of cyber-attacks by responsibility  
 Attacks where the victim is solely responsible for security (first party) and those where 
responsibility is shared with a third party both exhibit significant negative mean CARs (Table 4). 
Median CAR is insignificant for third party attacks. The mean and median CAR are more 
negative and more significant for first party attacks than third party attacks, but these differences 
are not statistically significant (Table 5). There is also no material change in these differences 
over time (Table 6). 
 Despite the lack of a difference in the raw mean and median results between first and 
third party attacks, our cross sectional regression in Table (7) indicates a potential difference. 
When controlling for other attack factors, there is some evidence that attacks where the victim is 
solely to blame are more damaging than when a third party shares the reputational and legal 
burdens of the attack. 
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E. Effect of cyber-attacks by type of information lost  
 Mean and median CARs are significantly negative when account information is lost 
(Table 4). Payment information only yields a significantly negative mean CAR when recession 
events are excluded, even though the mean is smaller in magnitude. Payment attack CARs 
exhibit considerable volatility during the recessionary period. Median damage is insignificant, 
indicating that payment information is generally well protected, but the wide discrepancy in the 
mean and median for payment attacks points to the presence of some extremely damaging 
attacks. The most damaging attack in the sample was a payment attack on Heartland Payment 
Systems in 2009 in which over 100 million credit card numbers were stolen, causing a drop in 
firm value of 45.4%.  
 Mean and median CARs for both identity and proprietary information attacks are both 
insignificant, though their sample sizes are relatively small. The result is especially surprising for 
identity attacks, where sensitive information such as social security numbers could lead to 
identity theft. It may be that consumers are not aware of the risk of identity theft, or companies 
who store identity information may be in less competitive industries. For example, the largest 
theft of identity data was an attack in 2015 on California's largest for-profit health insurer, 
Anthem Health, where the personal information of up to 78.8 million people was compromised.4 
The greater difficulty involved in switching one’s business to another provider and the multi-
                                                          
4 Initial media reports widely estimated the number of customers exposed to be approximately 80 million. Elizabeth 
Weise, Massive breach at health care company Anthem Inc., USAToday, Feb. 5, 2015. Available at: 
https://www.usatoday.com/story/tech/2015/02/04/health-care-anthem-hacked/22900925/   The full scale was 
confirmed by Anthem on Feb. 24, 2015 to be 78.8 million.  Anna Wilde Mathews, Anthem: Hacked Database 
Included 78.8 Million People, WSJ, Feb. 24, 2015. Available at: https://www.wsj.com/articles/anthem-hacked-
database-included-78-8-million-people-1424807364 
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year delay in publicly revealing the existence of the breach most likely played a role in the 
market’s reaction to the disclosure of this breach.  
 Again, statistically significant mean and median differences are elusive amongst the 
information types (Table 5). Identity attacks show signs of having a significantly less negative 
mean CAR than other attacks only when recession period events are excluded. There is also no 
evidence of a significant change in CARs for any particular type of information loss over time 
(Table 6). 
F. Effect of cyber-attacks by first or subsequent attacks 
 Both mean and median CARs for first and subsequent attacks are significant (Table 4). 
There is some evidence that the mean CAR is significantly worse for first attacks than for new 
attacks on previously attacked firms (Table 5). Companies who have never been attacked before 
may be less protected and less prepared to mitigate damage than those who have previously been 
attacked. However, the medians are not significantly different, and the significance of the mean 
difference disappears when we control for other factors in our cross sectional regressions (Table 
7). There is also no evidence of a change over time (Table 6). 
G. Effect of cyber-attacks by industry 
 Consumer non-durables, technology, and finance companies show significant negative 
mean CARs, though only the technology industry exhibits a significant median CAR (Table 4). 
The mean for the Finance industry is only marginally significant, while medians are 
insignificant. This indicates that finance companies generally do an effective job of protecting 
themselves and mitigating damage, but when their security fails the damage is very large. 
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 The only significant differences between industry CARs (Table 5) involve the “other” 
industry, which is significantly less affected by attacks than all other industries. This industry 
consists of companies such as airlines, courier services, and hotels. Cross sectional regression 
results (Table 7) also confirm pairwise that attacks are significantly more damaging for most 
industries relative to the “other” industry. F-tests for the equality of regression coefficients for 
each pairwise comparison of industries confirm that no other pair of industries exhibits a 
significant difference. These results are included in an online appendix C.3. 
Time plays an interesting role in results by industry as shown in Table (6).  Attacks on 
the technology industry became relatively less frequent and exhibited less significant damage 
after 2007. In fact, the mean and median CARs are insignificant for attacks on the technology 
industry after 2007. This is not unexpected as technology companies were early adopters of the 
internet and at the forefront of developing cyber networks. This provides evidence for the 
conjecture that technology companies were the best equipped in terms of resources and expertise 
to identify and respond to such threats.  
Very similar results are found for the telecom industry. Companies within this sector 
generally developed and controlled the infrastructure of the internet and include major internet 
service providers. They seem to have done well in protecting themselves from cyber-attacks 
since 2007, experiencing a relatively lower frequency of attacks and significantly less negative 
mean and median CARs (see Table 2). 
Both the number of attacks and the damage from attacks on retail companies have greatly 
increased. Often these attacks seek to steal customer payment information, with 58% of retail 
attacks targeting payment data. Ever since the TJ MAXX attack in 2007, large scale retail 
payment attacks have become more common. Unlike technology and telecom companies, retail 
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firms may lack the technology and in house expertise to identify and deal with cyber security 
issues.  
Like the retail industry, financial companies have been targeted more frequently since 
2007. While the mean and median CARs for cyber-attacks for financial companies are not 
significantly different over time, some extremely large and damaging attacks have occurred since 
2007. One example is the Heartland Payment Systems cyber-attack in 2009. 
These industry results combined with the decreased frequency of disrupt attacks and the 
increase in information attacks indicate that hacker motives appear to have changed over time. 
Attacks in the early period can be characterized as exploratory and disruptive that mainly 
targeted the technology of the internet and networks, while recent attacks are more sophisticated 
and profit driven. 
H. Other contingencies 
 Additional cross sectional results in Table (7) show that smaller firms suffer more when 
experiencing a cyber-attack. This is consistent with previous research by Cavusoglu et al (2004) 
and Acquisti, Friedman, and Telang (2006). If much of the legal liability or recovery costs are 
fixed, then it follows that these costs are a relatively higher burden for smaller firms. This could 
also be an indication that smaller firms leave more valuable data or infrastructure vulnerable than 
do large firms, possibly due to a lack of the resources necessary to protect themselves. 
 Another interesting observation is the effect of trailing events on returns. There is a very 
small, but significant, negative impact on CARs when there has been an unrelated cyber-attack 
within the last 30 days. It appears that the number of days that have passed since the last attack is 
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irrelevant, so it is a clustering of multiple recent attacks which elicits this effect. This is 
consistent with heightened media and investor awareness during periods of high attack activity. 
 Somewhat surprising as it is inconsistent with industry research by Ponemon (2016), the 
number of records lost is not a reliable predictor of CAR. This may be explained by inconsistent 
reporting of such information across attacks. Often the scale is not evident or revealed at first 
announcement, or the company decides not to provide details to the public on the number of 
records lost. Only 35% of all information attacks report the number of records lost.  
V. Robustness 
 The previous analysis was also conducted using a six factor asset pricing model from 
Fama and French (2016) which does not exclude the momentum factor. The results are included 
in online appendix A. Results were also evaluated including confounded events as outlined in 
online appendix B. 
 When a momentum factor is included, results are similar; with some minor changes in the 
significance of certain attacks. Mean CARs on payment attacks go from being marginally 
insignificant in the full sample including recession period events to being significant, mean 
CARs for companies who were previously hacked become insignificant, and mean CARs for 
attacks on finance companies become marginally insignificant. Differences in the mean CARs 
for attacks across characteristics and across time are not materially different. The decreased 
(increased) damage of attacks to technology (retail) firms becomes slightly less significant. 
Results of the cross sectional regressions are also very similar.  
 When confounded events are included, the mean and median CAR are still significantly 
negative. Results by characteristic and industry are generally similar. Mean CARs for attacks 
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where a third party shares blame, attacks where account information are lost, and attacks on 
consumer durable companies become insignificant; while the mean CARS for attacks targeting 
payment information become more significant. Significance of the medians is also reduced for 
attacks involving account information and for both the first hack and previously hacked 
categories. The only noticeable difference in regression results is the significance of the CAR 
due to disrupt attacks relative to integrity attacks. This is attributable more to the presence of 
confounding events with positive returns during some integrity attacks, as opposed to an 
increased severity of disrupt attacks 
 Robustness tests raise no concerns about our general results, which are generally robust 
to choice of asset pricing model, the exclusion or inclusion of confounded events or recession 
period events.  
VI. Conclusion 
 
 Cyber-attacks continue to cause significant damage to companies. The average (median) 
cumulative abnormal return that a company experiences when attacked is -0.69% (-0.37%), 
which translates into an average (median) $134,604,868 ($30,506,757) destruction of firm value. 
The magnitude and significance of this damage has not declined, counter to the findings reported 
by Gordon, Loeb, and Zhou (2011) and Yayla and Hu (2011).  We find that smaller firms are hit 
harder than larger firms which supports earlier findings by Cavusoglu et al (2004) and Acquisti, 
Friedman, and Telang (2006). Our finding that the number of cyber-attacks in a trailing 30-day 
period is negatively related to average cumulative abnormal returns implies that heightened 
awareness seems to lead to more concern amongst investors about cyber-attacks. 
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We have shown that either mean or median CARs are significantly negative for 
information attacks, disrupt attacks, theft of account data, theft of payment data, attacks on 
consumer non-durables companies, technology companies, and finance companies. The evidence 
for payment attacks and attacks on finance companies is mixed, as mean significance is due 
mainly to catastrophic outliers. We also reported some weak evidence of greater price effects for 
attacks where the attackee is solely to blame, and for first time attackees.  
The cyber attackees and the number of attacks and their price effects have changed over 
time. While early attacks tended to target technology and telecom companies with the purpose of 
disrupting their activities, recent attacks appear to have become more sinister and sophisticated 
and targeted at Finance and Retail companies. Specifically, the damages are significantly lower 
(higher) for Technology and Telecom (Retail) since 2007. Finance companies have experienced 
some of the most damaging attacks based on public disclosures. The damage from integrity 
attacks (generally website defacements and social media account hacks) and state sponsored 
attacks have been small during the period studied herein.  
We caution the reader that all of our conclusions are based on cyber attackees that are 
publicly traded, on the cyber attackees publicly acknowledging the cyber breach, and the 
specificity of the information made public about the cyber breach such as its breadth and 
severity. Furthermore, the power of our tests for some cyber categories is negatively affected by 
smaller sample sizes and how well the first disclosure of a cyber breach captures the severity of a 
breach when the full extent of its disclosure occurs over a period from a few days to several 
months and when the cyber attackees first disclosure of the cyber breach is such that it contains 
information that it has enacted remediation actions to eliminate its cyber vulnerability. 
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Appendix 
 
Table 1: Sample attrition 
Attrition of the sample due to insufficient return data in the [-130, 130] estimation window around the 
event date, confounding events within the [-1, 1] event window, and recession periods defined by the 
NBER are shown below. Confounding events in the sample include items such as earnings reports, 
earning guidance, and analyst ratings changes that are publicly announced during the event 
window. 
 
Criteria Impact on Sample Size 
 Overall 1997-2007 2008-2015 
Initial Sample 350 144 206 
    
Insufficient return data in estimation period -8 -6 -2 
Confounding events -29 -12 -17 
     
Full Sample 313 126 187 
    
Recession period events -36 -20 -16 
    
Sample excluding recession period events 277 106 171 
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Table 2: Description of the sample 
The number of cyberattack events collected between January 1, 1997 and December 31, 2015 is reported 
by attack characteristics and industry. These exclude events with insufficient return data and confounding 
events within a 3-day period centered on the event date (see Table 1 for sample attrition). The number of 
firms is presented for the full time period and the two sub periods. Recession events are events whose [-
130, 130] estimation windows overlap an NBER defined recession period. 







per firm  Full 1997-2007 2008-2015 Recession Mean Median 
Overall 313 126 187 36 61.5 23.2 170 1.84 
Disrupt 110 83 27 15 84.3 33.9 65 1.69 
Information 156 36 120 15 47.8 15.0 118 1.32 
Integrity 47 7 40 6 53.8 26.4 31 1.52 
Hacktivism 22 1 21 0 39.1 17.7 19 1.16 
State Sponsored 25 0 25 0 57.5 34.1 21 1.19 
Cybercrime 266 125 141 36 63.8 23.1 156 1.71 
First Party at Fault 208 51 157 31 64.0 20.3 123 1.69 
Third Party at Fault 105 75 30 5 56.8 32.5 79 1.33 
Account 49 4 45 4 43.5 14.8 42 1.17 
Identity 21 6 15 4 28.7 11.2 20 1.05 
Payment 62 20 42 7 52.9 20.4 50 1.24 
Proprietary 23 4 19 0 64.6 21.9 21 1.10 
Previously Hacked 143 50 93 15 96.5 41.9 59 2.42 
First Hack 170 76 94 21 32.1 10.4 170 1.00 
Consumer Non Durables 21 10 11 3 7.6 5.4 8 2.63 
Durables and Manuft. 28 12 16 1 42.0 5.3 12 2.33 
Technology 97 48 49 16 107.7 38.4 43 2.26 
Telecom and TV 31 18 13 4 61.2 45.1 15 2.07 
Wholesale and Retail 31 4 27 2 30.7 10.6 26 1.19 
Finance 68 24 44 4 57.0 36.4 38 1.79 
Other 37 10 27 6 20.5 7.7 28 1.32 
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Table 3: Mean and median CAR by event day 
The mean and median abnormal and cumulative abnormal returns are presented by time period for the event 
window [-1, 1]. Abnormal returns are estimated from regression model 𝑅𝑖𝑡 =  𝛼𝑖 + ∑ 𝛽𝑖𝑗𝐹𝑗𝑡 +
∑ 𝛾𝑖𝑇𝐷𝑇
1
𝑇=−1 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 where 𝑅𝑖𝑡 is the excess return over the one month treasury bill rate on the security for 
event i on day t;  𝐹𝑗𝑡 are the excess returns on the market (𝑀𝐾𝑇𝑅𝐹), size (𝑆𝑀𝐵), value (𝐻𝑀𝐿), 
profitability(𝑅𝑀𝑊), and investment (𝐶𝑀𝐴) risk factors (Fama, 2015) for day t, DT is a dummy variable 
equal to one on day τ in the event window [-1, 1], and zero otherwise;  and 𝜀𝑖𝑡 is the error term. Abnormal 
returns are summed over the event window to compute cumulative abnormal returns. Significance of the 
means (medians) as determined by a two-tailed t-test (sign test) is highlighted with * for 10% level, ** for 
5% level, and *** for 1% level. 
  1997-2015 Overall    1997-2015 Excluding Recession 
 Mean p   Median p   Mean p   Median p 
CAR -0.0069*** 0.0014  -0.0037*** 0.0066  -0.0056*** 0.0003  -0.0035** 0.0161 
t-1 -0.0008 0.4093  -0.0004 0.572  -0.0001 0.8765  -0.0004 0.471 
t=0 -0.0054*** <.0001  -0.0039*** <.0001  -0.0054*** <.0001  -0.0037*** <.0001 
t+1 -0.0007 0.6337   0.0005 0.8212   -0.0001 0.9347   -0.0002 1.0000 
  1997-2007 
 Mean p   Median p   Mean p   Median p 
CAR -0.0075*** 0.0043  -0.0049* 0.0901  -0.0067** 0.0150  -0.0040 0.2065 
t-1 -0.0020 0.2885  -0.0012 0.7894  -0.0010 0.5180  -0.0016 0.4968 
t=0 -0.0058*** 0.0005  -0.0041*** 0.0031  -0.0053*** 0.0029  -0.0037** 0.0148 
t+1 0.0004 0.8072   -0.0006 0.6562   -0.0003 0.8565   -0.0013 0.3821 
  2008-2015 
 Mean p   Median p   Mean p   Median p 
CAR -0.0065** 0.0392  -0.0034** 0.0403  -0.005*** 0.0069  -0.0035** 0.0465 
t-1 0.0001 0.9168  -0.0004 0.6609  0.0004 0.6118  -0.0004 0.7598 
t=0 -0.0051*** 0.0004  -0.0037*** 0.0007  -0.0055*** <.0001  -0.0037*** 0.0007 
t+1 -0.0015 0.5240   0.0011 0.4647   0.0001 0.9404   0.0010 0.5408 
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Table 4: Mean and median CAR by characteristic and industry 
The mean and median cumulative abnormal return is presented by attack characteristic and industry. Abnormal returns are estimated from regression 
model 𝑅𝑖𝑡 =  𝛼𝑖 + ∑ 𝛽𝑖𝑗𝐹𝑗𝑡 + ∑ 𝛾𝑖𝑇𝐷𝑇
1
𝑇=−1 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 where 𝑅𝑖𝑡 is the excess return over the one month treasury bill rate on the security for event i on 
day t;  𝐹𝑗𝑡 are the excess returns on the market (𝑀𝐾𝑇𝑅𝐹), size (𝑆𝑀𝐵), value (𝐻𝑀𝐿), profitability(𝑅𝑀𝑊), and investment (𝐶𝑀𝐴) risk factors (Fama 
and French, 2015) for day t, DT is a dummy variable equal to one on day τ in the event window [-1, 1], and zero otherwise;  and 𝜀𝑖𝑡 is the error term. 
Abnormal returns are summed over the three-day event window [-1, 1] to compute cumulative abnormal returns. Significance of the means (medians) 
as determined by a two tailed t-test (sign test) is highlighted with * for 10% level, ** for 5% level, and *** for 1% level. 
Overall 
Overall  Excluding Recession 
N Mean p Median p  N Mean p Median p 
313 -0.0069*** 0.0014 -0.0037*** 0.0066  277 -0.0056*** 0.0003 -0.0035** 0.0161 
Disrupt 110 -0.0054** 0.0270 -0.0031 0.1046  95 -0.0050** 0.0472 -0.0029 0.2181 
Information 156 -0.0092** 0.0181 -0.0045** 0.0450  141 -0.0072*** 0.0028 -0.0046** 0.0429 
Integrity 47 -0.0026 0.3061 -0.0037 0.5601  41 -0.0017 0.5153 -0.0017 0.7552 
Hacktivism 22 0.0010 0.8228 0.0016 0.8318  22 0.0010 0.8228 0.0016 0.8318 
State Sponsored 25 -0.0059 0.1380 -0.0067 0.4244  25 -0.0059 0.1380 -0.0067 0.4244 
Cybercrime 266 -0.0076*** 0.0021 -0.0043*** 0.0057  230 -0.0062*** 0.0004 -0.0041** 0.0145 
First Party at Fault 208 -0.0081*** 0.0076 -0.0045** 0.0219  177 -0.0063*** 0.0017 -0.0043* 0.0504 
Third Party at Fault 105 -0.0045* 0.0509 -0.0028 0.1716  100 -0.0045* 0.0637 -0.0028 0.1933 
Account 49 -0.0059* 0.0670 -0.0048** 0.0213  45 -0.0075** 0.0246 -0.0103** 0.0161 
Identity 21 -0.0039 0.3971 0.0013 0.6636  17 0.0014 0.6786 0.0029 0.3323 
Payment 62 -0.0138 0.1185 -0.0045 0.2529  55 -0.0089** 0.0304 -0.0047 0.1770 
Proprietary 23 -0.0047 0.4224 -0.0044 1.0000  23 -0.0047 0.4224 -0.0044 1.0000 
Previously Hacked 143 -0.0031* 0.0992 -0.0035* 0.0654  128 -0.0031* 0.0850 -0.0035* 0.0927 
First Hack 170 -0.0101*** 0.0056 -0.0047* 0.0549  149 -0.0078*** 0.0013 -0.0046 0.1010 
Consumer Non Durables 21 -0.0082* 0.0720 -0.0110 0.1892  18 -0.0091* 0.0861 -0.0116 0.2379 
Durables and Manuft. 28 -0.0059 0.2420 -0.0045 0.3449  27 -0.0066 0.2054 -0.0051 0.2478 
Technology 97 -0.0073*** 0.0096 -0.0064** 0.0250  81 -0.0055** 0.0383 -0.0056 0.1193 
Telecom and TV 31 -0.0054 0.2370 -0.0032 1.0000  27 -0.0063 0.2205 -0.0032 1.0000 
Wholesale and Retail 31 -0.0063 0.2133 -0.0071 0.4731  29 -0.0085 0.1022 -0.0071 0.2649 
Finance 68 -0.0128* 0.0943 -0.0023 0.3961  64 -0.0062 0.1071 -0.0017 0.5323 
Other 37 0.0033 0.5464 0.0013 1.0000  31 0.0012 0.7090 0.0013 1.0000 
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Table 5: Mean and median differences in CAR across characteristic subgroups 
Differences in the mean CAR between attacks with the noted characteristics and all others is shown along with the results of a two-tailed student t-
test and a Wilcoxon Rank Sum Test. CARs are estimated using the Five Factor asset pricing model. Shapiro-Wilks tests (not shown) indicate non-
normality for all difference tests, indicating that the Wilcoxon results may be more appropriate. Results for the full sample and excluding those 
events whose [-130,130] estimation window overlap a NBER defined recession are shown. Dif. refers to Difference. 
  
  
Overall   Excluding Recession 
Mean Dif. T p-value 
Median 
Dif. W p-value   Mean Dif. T p-value 
Median 
Dif. W p-value 
Disrupt 0.0022 0.58 0.5633 0.0013 17393 0.8728   0.0010 0.31 0.7604 0.0014 13494 0.6489 
Information -0.0046 -1.08 0.2820 -0.0013 23944 0.4945  -0.0032 -1.05 0.2951 -0.0023 19644 0.2682 
Integrity 0.0050 1.42 0.1563 0.0001 7804 0.4585   0.0046 1.44 0.1542 0.0021 6150 0.3422 
Hacktivism 0.0085* 1.73 0.0920 0.0060 3910 0.2666  0.0072 1.27 0.2034 0.0059 3454 0.2736 
State Sponsored 0.0011 0.24 0.8120 -0.0031 3800 0.7744  -0.0003 -0.07 0.9427 -0.0032 3341 0.7270 
Cybercrime -0.0050 -1.31 0.1943 -0.0011 7710 0.5638   -0.0036 -1.05 0.2958 -0.0010 6795 0.6017 
First Party at Fault -0.0036 -0.94 0.3465 -0.0018 16853 0.6272   -0.0018 -0.58 0.5642 -0.0014 14172 0.6719 
Account 0.0011 0.29 0.7760 -0.0013 7182 0.3809  -0.0023 -0.55 0.5856 -0.0072 5531 0.1424 
Identity 0.0032 0.64 0.5294 0.0055 3511 0.5944  0.0075* 2.03 0.0535 0.0071 2772 0.2028 
Payment -0.0086 -0.97 0.3341 -0.0010 9361 0.5598  -0.0041 -0.95 0.3440 -0.0014 7123 0.3277 
Proprietary 0.0024 0.39 0.6972 -0.0008 3784 0.6800   0.0011 0.19 0.8486 -0.0009 3340 0.6988 
First Hack -0.0070* -1.74 0.0836 -0.0012 23210 0.3423   -0.0047 -1.58 0.1147 -0.0011 18328 0.4212 
Consumer Non Durables -0.0014 -0.29 0.7717 -0.0075 2877 0.2958  -0.0037 -0.59 0.5536 -0.0084 2103 0.2263 
Durables and Manuft. 0.0010 0.19 0.8511 -0.0011 4292 0.8210  -0.0011 -0.22 0.8283 -0.0017 3559 0.6250 
Technology -0.0006 -0.14 0.8859 -0.0032 14650 0.4352  0.0002 0.07 0.9435 -0.0022 11155 0.8646 
Telecom and TV 0.0017 0.34 0.7356 0.0009 5007 0.7707  -0.0007 -0.14 0.8866 0.0006 3771 0.9647 
Wholesale and Retail 0.0006 0.11 0.9093 -0.0035 4791 0.8747  -0.0032 -0.61 0.5470 -0.0038 3720 0.4475 
Finance -0.0076 -0.98 0.3315 0.0021 10878 0.7604  -0.0007 -0.18 0.8586 0.0027 9195 0.5957 
Other 0.0116* 1.76 0.0796 0.0062 6646 0.1058   0.0077* 2.09 0.0417 0.0062 5000 0.1006 
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Table 6: Mean and median differences by subgroup over time 
Differences in mean CARs between the sub period 1997 to 2007 and sub period 2008 to 2015 are shown along with the results of a two tailed 
student t-test and a Wilcoxon Rank Sum Test. CARs are estimated using the Five Factor asset pricing model. Shapiro-Wilks tests are conducted on 
each subgroup by period and those groups which are not significantly non-normal are indicated with a *. Student t-test results are appropriate for 
these groups. Reported t-values assume either unequal or equal variance as appropriate based on an equality of variance (Folded F) test. For all 
others, Wilcoxon results may be more appropriate. Results for the full sample and excluding those events whose [-130,130] estimation window 
overlap a NBER defined recession are shown. Dif. refers to Difference. 
  Overall   Excluding Recession  













Overall 0.0010 0.24 0.8101 0.0014 19174 0.4397   0.0017 0.52 0.6069 0.0005 14707 0.9674 
Disrupt -0.0013 -0.23 0.8165 0.0005 1497 0.9945  0.0014 0.23 0.8219 0.0006 988 0.8023 
Information 0.0050 0.65 0.5159 0.0011 2692 0.5752  0.0053 0.77 0.4487 0.0016 1908 0.6818 
Integrity 0.0050 0.70 0.4898 0.0045 144 0.4861   -0.0057 -0.55 0.5844 -0.0075 70 0.7466 
Hacktivism* -0.0162 -0.77 0.4481 -0.0152 18 0.3550  -0.0162 -0.77 0.4481 -0.0152 18 0.3550 
Cybercrime 0.0001 0.01 0.9906 0.0014 16448 0.7030   0.0012 0.34 0.7313 0.0003 12131 0.9952 
Third Party at Fault 0.0048 0.81 0.4208 0.0028 4874 0.2245  0.0066 1.15 0.2552 0.0027 2840 0.3134 
First Party at Fault 0.0002 0.05 0.9602 -0.0027 1527 0.6584   -0.0007 -0.16 0.8736 -0.0037 1375 0.5006 
Account* -0.0041 -0.35 0.7248 -0.0016 115 0.5989  0.0063 0.28 0.7787 0.0058 18 0.7306 
Identity* 0.0100 1.00 0.3301 0.0154 56 0.4682  0.0063 0.71 0.4881 0.0142 23 0.6651 
Payment 0.0067 -0.48 0.6345 -0.0061 646 0.8162  -0.0061 -0.90 0.3732 -0.0063 543 0.4928 
Proprietary 0.0284 1.39 0.2483 0.0175 32 0.2219   0.0284 1.39 0.2483 0.0175 32 0.2219 
Previously Hacked -0.0008 -0.12 0.9049 0.0016 6496 0.9963  0.0005 0.11 0.9102 0.0006 4884 0.7493 
First Hack 0.0017 0.43 0.6659 0.0008 3478 0.6078   0.0020 0.53 0.5969 -0.0015 2648 0.7593 
Consumer Non Durables* -0.0091 -1.05 0.3063 -0.0038 126 0.2880  -0.0101 -1.01 0.3278 -0.0103 89 0.2822 
Durables and Manuft.* -0.0055 -0.60 0.5563 -0.0052 183 0.6962  -0.0041 -0.44 0.6626 -0.0038 159 0.8260 
Technology 0.0112* 2.05 0.0432 0.0054* 2116 0.0893  0.0118** 2.28 0.0259 0.0068 1394 0.1257 
Telecom and TV* 0.0160* 2.11 0.0465 0.0155* 256 0.0564  0.0151* 1.78 0.0910 0.0141 184 0.1574 
Wholesale and Retail -0.0196 -1.34 0.1918 -0.0218* 95 0.0714  -0.0205 -1.25 0.2217 -0.0212 68 0.1183 
Finance -0.0156 -1.20 0.2361 -0.0045 927 0.2106  -0.0056 -0.71 0.4822 -0.0045 835 0.2280 
Other* 0.0065 0.52 0.6072 0.0005 185 0.8786   -0.0063 -0.80 0.4312 -0.0027 125 0.5592 
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Table 7: Cross sectional regression of CAR  
Results are reported for a cross sectional regression of determinants of cumulative abnormal returns. CARs used are calculated using a Five Factor 
asset pricing model. Firm size is the natural logarithm of firm size (in thousands) on the day of the attack. Days passed is the natural logarithm of 
the number of calendar days since the last attack. Trailing events count the number of cyber-attacks on publicly traded companies in the last 30 
trading days. Number of records is the natural logarithm of the number of records lost in an attack. The remaining variables are dummies for the 
stated attack, industry, or time attribute. Results are shown for OLS estimates with ordinary and heteroscedasticity consistent standard errors. 
Robust regressions are conducted using the M-estimation method. Significance is highlighted with * for 10% level, ** for 5% level, and *** for 
1% level. Std. Error refers to standard error. 




Std. Error p-value Coefficient Std. Error p-value 
Intercept   -0.0818** 0.0371 0.0284 0.0364 0.0253   -0.0402 0.0207 0.0522 
Firm Size   0.0044*** 0.0014 0.0017 0.0017 0.0090   0.0021*** 0.0008 0.0071 
Disrupt   0.0018 0.0076 0.8086 0.0060 0.7601   -0.0005 0.0042 0.9138 
Identity   0.0022 0.0112 0.8466 0.0081 0.7893   0.0010 0.0062 0.8729 
Account   -0.0042 0.0086 0.6256 0.0059 0.4774   -0.0060 0.0048 0.2106 
Payment   -0.0092 0.0089 0.2987 0.0115 0.4240   -0.0061 0.0049 0.2174 
Proprietary   -0.0008 0.0099 0.9354 0.0070 0.9084   0.0013 0.0055 0.8180 
Hacktivism   0.0064 0.0111 0.5651 0.0050 0.2047   0.0067 0.0062 0.2808 
Crime   0.0011 0.0094 0.9107 0.0055 0.8496   0.0042 0.0052 0.4242 
First Party   -0.0083* 0.0063 0.1904 0.0044 0.0600   -0.0042 0.0035 0.2391 
First Hack   -0.0027 0.0050 0.5924 0.0036 0.4570   -0.0007 0.0028 0.8097 
Consumer Non Durables  -0.0114 0.0107 0.2882 0.0075 0.1288   -0.0095 0.0059 0.1094 
Durables and Manuft.   -0.0144* 0.0099 0.1457 0.0086 0.0937   -0.0081 0.0055 0.1425 
Technology   -0.0173** 0.0079 0.0290 0.0074 0.0192   -0.0102** 0.0044 0.0209 
Telecom and TV   -0.0183** 0.0095 0.0563 0.0086 0.0343   -0.0090* 0.0053 0.0906 
Wholesale and Retail   -0.0087 0.0095 0.3634 0.0093 0.3503   -0.0054 0.0053 0.3112 
Finance   -0.0225** 0.0081 0.0056 0.0113 0.0467   -0.0074* 0.0045 0.0986 
Days Passed   -0.0009 0.0015 0.5619 0.0012 0.4554   -0.0006 0.0008 0.4606 
Trailing Events   -0.0013** 0.0007 0.0764 0.0006 0.0451   -0.0009** 0.0004 0.0257 
1997-2007   -0.0028 0.0063 0.6570 0.0068 0.6821   -0.0023 0.0035 0.5052 
Recession Window   -0.0088 0.0073 0.2267 0.0148 0.5525   -0.0010 0.0040 0.8107 
Number of Records   0.0003 0.0006 0.5343 0.0005 0.5117   0.0000 0.0003 0.9460 
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Online Appendix A: Results using a six factor asset pricing model to estimate 
abnormal returns 
 
Table A.1: Mean and median CAR by event day, Six Factor Model 
The mean and median abnormal and cumulative abnormal returns are presented by time period for the event 
window [-1, 1]. Abnormal returns are estimated from regression model 𝑅𝑖𝑡 =  𝛼𝑖 + ∑ 𝛽𝑖𝑗𝐹𝑗𝑡 +
∑ 𝛾𝑖𝑇𝐷𝑇
1
𝑇=−1 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 where 𝑅𝑖𝑡 is the excess return over the one month treasury bill rate on the security for 
event i on day t;  𝐹𝑗𝑡 are the excess returns on the market (𝑀𝐾𝑇𝑅𝐹), size (𝑆𝑀𝐵), value (𝐻𝑀𝐿), momentum 
(𝑈𝑀𝐷),  profitability(𝑅𝑀𝑊), and investment (𝐶𝑀𝐴) risk factors (Fama, 2015) for day t, DT is a dummy 
variable equal to one on day τ in the event window [-1, 1], and zero otherwise;  and 𝑒𝑖𝑡 is the error term. 
Abnormal returns are summed over the event window to compute cumulative abnormal returns. 
Significance of the means (medians) as determined by a two-tailed t-test (sign test) is highlighted with * 
for 10% level, ** for 5% level, and *** for 1% level. 
  1997-2015 Overall     1997-2015 Excluding Recession   
  Mean p Median p   Mean p Median p 
CAR -0.0071*** 0.0008 -0.0041*** 0.0092   -0.0056*** 0.0004 -0.0040** 0.0222 
t-1 -0.0008 0.3669 -0.0005 0.4977   -0.0003 0.7205 -0.0006 0.4710 
t=0 -0.0055** <.0001 -0.0035*** <.0001   -0.0053*** <.0001 -0.0033*** <.0001 
t+1 -0.0008 0.5956 0.0003 0.6512   0.0000 0.9748 0.0000 0.9044 
  1997-2007 
  Mean p Median p   Mean p Median p 
CAR -0.0079*** 0.0035 -0.0052* 0.0901   -0.0074** 0.0110 -0.0050 0.2065 
t-1 -0.0025 0.1815 -0.0016 0.4228   -0.0016 0.3130 -0.0018 0.2853 
t=0 -0.0057*** 0.0007 -0.0039*** 0.0031   -0.0052*** 0.0037 -0.0033** 0.0148 
t+1 0.0003 0.8535 -0.0003 0.9291   -0.0005 0.7698 -0.0015 0.6274 
  2008-2015 
  Mean p Median p   Mean p Median p 
CAR -0.0066** 0.0308 -0.0032* 0.0570   -0.0046** 0.0139 -0.0032* 0.0661 
t-1 0.0003 0.7363 -0.0001 0.8838   0.0005 0.5233 0.0000 1.0000 
t=0 -0.0053*** <.0001 -0.0033*** 0.0007   -0.0054*** <.0001 -0.0033*** 0.0007 
t+1 -0.0016 0.4984 0.0008 0.4647   0.0003 0.7855 0.0005 0.5408 
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Table A.2. Mean and median CAR by characteristic and industry, Six Factor Model 
The mean and median cumulative abnormal return is presented by attack characteristic and industry. Abnormal returns are estimated from 
regression model 𝑅𝑖𝑡 =  𝛼𝑖 + ∑ 𝛽𝑖𝑗𝐹𝑗𝑡 + ∑ 𝛾𝑖𝑇𝐷𝑇
1
𝑇=−1 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 where 𝑅𝑖𝑡 is the excess return over the one month treasury bill rate on the security for 
event i on day t;  𝐹𝑗𝑡 are the excess returns on the market (𝑀𝐾𝑇𝑅𝐹), size (𝑆𝑀𝐵), value (𝐻𝑀𝐿), momentum (𝑈𝑀𝐷), profitability(𝑅𝑀𝑊), and 
investment (𝐶𝑀𝐴) risk factors (Fama and French, 2015) for day t, DT is a dummy variable equal to one on day τ in the event window [-1, 1], and 
zero otherwise;  and 𝜀𝑖𝑡 is the error term. Abnormal returns are summed over the three-day event window [-1, 1] to compute cumulative abnormal 
returns. Significance of the means (medians) as determined by a two tailed t-test (sign test) is highlighted with * for 10% level, ** for 5% level, 
and *** for 1% level. 
  Overall   Excluding Recession 
  N Mean p Median p   N Mean p Median p 
Overall 313 -0.0071*** 0.0008 -0.0041*** 0.0092   277 -0.0056*** 0.0004 -0.0040** 0.0222 
Disrupt 110 -0.0061** 0.0203 -0.0040 0.1046   95 -0.0058** 0.0334 -0.0040 0.2181 
Information 156 -0.0093** 0.0135 -0.0037** 0.0450   141 -0.0068*** 0.0052 -0.0042** 0.0429 
Integrity 47 -0.0024 0.3580 -0.0042 0.7709   41 -0.0015 0.5829 -0.0020 1.0000 
Hacktivism 22 0.0012 0.7744 0.0007 0.8318   22 0.0012 0.7744 0.0007 0.8318 
State Sponsored 25 -0.0050 0.2050 -0.0058 0.4244   25 -0.0050 0.2050 -0.0058 0.4244 
Cybercrime 266 -0.0080*** 0.0011 -0.0042*** 0.0083   230 -0.0064*** 0.0005 -0.0042** 0.0208 
First Party at Fault 208 -0.0082*** 0.0052 -0.0042** 0.0441   177 -0.0059*** 0.0034 -0.0042* 0.0979 
Third Party at Fault 105 -0.0050** 0.0466 -0.0025 0.1180   100 -0.0052** 0.0468 -0.0029 0.1332 
Account 49 -0.0058* 0.0722 -0.0046** 0.0444   45 -0.0075** 0.0236 -0.0090** 0.0357 
Identity 21 -0.0035 0.4598 0.0014 0.6636   17 0.0021 0.5680 0.0030 0.3323 
Payment 62 -0.0149* 0.0791 -0.0045 0.2529   55 -0.0087** 0.0376 -0.0048 0.1770 
Proprietary 23 -0.0033 0.5684 -0.0033 0.6776   23 -0.0033 0.5684 -0.0033 0.6776 
Previously Hacked 143 -0.0027 0.1520 -0.0041** 0.0444   128 -0.0029 0.1130 -0.0040* 0.0630 
First Hack 170 -0.0108*** 0.0024 -0.0040 0.1070   149 -0.0080*** 0.0014 -0.0030 0.1898 
Consumer Non Durables 21 -0.0090** 0.0478 -0.0118 0.1892   18 -0.0099* 0.0601 -0.0119 0.2379 
Durables and Manuft. 28 -0.0053 0.2873 -0.0043 0.3449   27 -0.0058 0.2591 -0.0044 0.2478 
Technology 97 -0.0076*** 0.0075 -0.0056** 0.0417   81 -0.0062** 0.0263 -0.0055 0.1821 
Telecom and TV 31 -0.0050 0.3054 -0.0020 1.0000   27 -0.0059 0.2878 -0.0020 1.0000 
Wholesale and Retail 31 -0.0066 0.1816 -0.0030 0.4731   29 -0.0081 0.1191 -0.0049 0.2649 
Finance 68 -0.0120 0.1198 -0.0028 0.3961   64 -0.0055 0.1558 -0.0014 0.5323 
Other 37 0.0006 0.8868 0.0014 1.0000   31 0.0008 0.8254 0.0014 1.0000 
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A.3. Mean and median differences in CAR across characteristic subgroups, Six Factor Model 
Differences in the mean CAR between attacks with the noted characteristics and all others is shown along with the results of a two-tailed student t-
test and a Wilcoxon Rank Sum Test. CARs are estimated using the Five Factor asset pricing model. Shapiro-Wilks tests (not shown) indicate non-
normality for all difference tests, indicating that the Wilcoxon results may be more appropriate. Results for the full sample and excluding those 
events whose [-130,130] estimation window overlap a NBER defined recession are shown. Dif. refers to Difference. 
 









value   
Mean 





Disrupt 0.0016 0.42 0.6769 0.0001 17097 0.8216   -0.0002 -0.06 0.9502 -0.0003 13223 0.9780 
Information -0.0043 -1.03 0.3033 0.0003 24239 0.7527   -0.0023 -0.72 0.4714 -0.0003 19387 0.4697 
Integrity 0.0056 1.59 0.1138 -0.0001 7805 0.4575   0.0049 1.49 0.1396 0.0020 6164 0.3274 
Hacktivism 0.0090 1.90 0.0653 0.0049 3931 0.2452   0.0074 1.66 0.1070 0.0049 3471 0.2535 
State Sponsored 0.0023 0.51 0.6108 -0.0019 3857 0.8765   0.0007 0.16 0.8718 -0.0023 3391 0.8271 
Cybercrime -0.0059 -1.59 0.1149 -0.0022 7788 0.4756   -0.0043 -1.27 0.2075 -0.0022 6862 0.5121 
First Party at Fault -0.0032 0.83 0.4047 -0.0017 16592 0.8881   0.0007 -0.23 0.8210 -0.0013 13890 0.9882 
Account 0.0016 0.39 0.6975 -0.0007 7221 0.4183   -0.0023 -0.62 0.5380 -0.0057 5545 0.1502 
Identity 0.0039 0.76 0.4513 0.0056 3551 0.5273   0.0082 2.09 0.0473 0.0072 2825 0.1495 
Payment -0.0097 -1.14 0.2591 -0.0005 9445 0.6515   -0.0038 -0.86 0.3944 -0.0012 7195 0.3988 
Proprietary 0.0042 0.69 0.4975 0.0008 3917 0.4652   0.0026 0.45 0.6502 0.0007 3458 0.4795 
First Hack -0.0081** -2.04 0.0422 0.0000 23375 0.2478   -0.0051* -1.67 0.0951 0.0010 18423 0.3437 
Consumer Non Durables -0.0021 -0.43 0.6729 -0.0083 2808 0.2236   -0.0046 -0.72 0.4714 -0.0087 2043 0.1641 
Durables and Manuft. 0.0020 0.37 0.7142 -0.0006 4384 0.9799   -0.0002 -0.04 0.9684 -0.0011 3657 0.8093 
Technology -0.0008 -0.19 0.8492 -0.0029 14554 0.363   -0.0008 -0.23 0.8156 -0.0023 11057 0.7399 
Telecom and TV 0.0024 0.45 0.6526 0.0022 5066 0.6784   -0.0002 -0.05 0.9631 0.0022 3829 0.8487 
Wholesale and Retail 0.0006 0.11 0.9104 0.0011 4805 0.8978   -0.0027 -0.53 0.5961 -0.0011 3776 0.5335 
Finance -0.0062 -0.80 0.4289 0.0014 11021 0.6022   0.0001 0.03 0.9758 0.0028 9289 0.4855 
Other 0.0088* 1.85 0.0687 0.0059 6503 0.1807   0.0072* 1.84 0.0729 0.0057 4852 0.1979 
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A.4. Mean and median differences by subgroup over time, Six Factor Model 
Differences in mean CARs between the sub period 1997 to 2007 and sub period 2008 to 2015 are shown along with the results of a two tailed 
student t-test and a Wilcoxon Rank Sum Test. CARs are estimated using the Five Factor asset pricing model. Shapiro-Wilks tests are conducted on 
each subgroup by period and those groups which are not significantly non-normal are indicated with a *. Student t-test results are appropriate for 
these groups. Reported t-values assume either unequal or equal variance as appropriate based on an equality of variance (Folded F) test. For all 
others, Wilcoxon results may be more appropriate. Results for the full sample and excluding those events whose [-130,130] estimation window 
overlap a NBER defined recession are shown. Dif. refers to Difference. 
 
  Overall   Excluding Recession 
  









Overall 0.0013 0.33 0.7422 0.0019 19174 0.4397   0.0028 0.84 0.4030 0.0018 14454 0.6666 
Disrupt -0.0004 -0.06 0.9523 0.0017 1523 0.8679   0.0026 0.47 0.6426 0.0025 1007 0.6722 
Information 0.0042 0.55 0.5812 0.0019 2680 0.5414   0.0056 0.79 0.4331 0.0024 1901 0.6555 
Integrity 0.0059 0.82 0.4189 0.0029 142 0.4500   -0.0036 -0.34 0.7350 -0.0056 65 0.9405 
Hacktivism* -0.0135 -0.67 0.5113 -0.0138 18 0.3550   -0.0135 -0.67 0.5113 -0.0138 18 0.3550 
Cybercrime 0.0002 0.03 0.9738 0.0020 16258 0.4939   0.0023 0.62 0.5352 0.0019 11950 0.7251 
Third Party at Fault 0.0021 0.43 0.6693 0.0023 1580 0.9464   0.0006 0.13 0.8987 0.0021 1414 0.7049 
First Party at Fault 0.0042 0.71 0.4793 -0.0003 4865 0.2155   0.0070 1.21 0.2335 -0.0007 2832 0.2996 
Account* -0.0061 -0.53 0.6007 -0.0011 116 0.5740   0.0059 0.27 0.7914 0.0065 18 0.7306 
Identity* 0.0133 1.32 0.2009 0.0159 53 0.3421   0.0086 0.6 0.6027 0.0153 22 0.5786 
Payment -0.0098 -0.73 0.4678 -0.0079 650 0.7700   -0.0062 -0.89 0.3772 -0.0093 546 0.4599 
Proprietary 0.0304 1.42 0.2413 0.0144 31 0.1884   0.0304 1.42 0.2413 0.0144 31 0.1884 
Previously Hacked 0.0012 0.31 0.7551 0.0016 3504 0.6866   0.0014 0.35 0.7277 0.0007 2679 0.8812 
First Hack 0.0000 -0.01 0.9950 0.0023 6334 0.6090   0.0031 0.6 0.5517 0.0026 4722 0.7667 
Consumer Non Durables* -0.0082 -0.95 0.3523 -0.0029 124 0.3531   -0.0093 -0.93 0.3653 -0.0097 88 0.3212 
Durables and Manuft.* -0.0028 -0.31 0.7620 -0.0030 176 0.9450   -0.0017 -0.18 0.8576 -0.0015 154 1.0000 
Technology 0.0125** 2.26 0.0262 0.0039 2088 0.0570   0.0140** 2.56 0.0131 0.0065* 1363 0.0655 
Telecom and TV* 0.0161* 1.98 0.0613 0.0136* 254 0.0681   0.0155 1.69 0.1082 0.0140 181 0.2024 
Wholesale and Retail -0.0191** -2.42 0.0371 -0.0208* 95 0.0618   -0.0191** -2.42 0.0371 -0.0207 68 0.1117 
Finance -0.0161 -1.22 0.2285 -0.0076 940 0.1535   -0.0064 -0.73 0.4691 -0.0102 846 0.1716 
Other* 0.0050 0.54 0.5950 0.0007 182 0.7990   -0.0033 -0.38 0.7073 -0.0034 118 0.7968 
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A.5. Cross sectional regression of CAR, Six Factor Model 
Results are reported for a cross sectional regression of determinants of cumulative abnormal returns. CARs used are calculated using a Five Factor 
asset pricing model. Firm size is the natural logarithm of firm size (in thousands) on the day of the attack. Days passed is the natural logarithm of 
the number of calendar days since the last attack. Trailing events count the number of cyber-attacks on publicly traded companies in the last 30 
trading days. Number of records is the natural logarithm of the number of records lost in an attack. The remaining variables are dummies for the 
stated attack, industry, or time attribute. Results are shown for OLS estimates with ordinary and heteroscedasticity consistent standard errors. 
Robust regressions are conducted using the M-estimation method. Significance is highlighted with * for 10% level, ** for 5% level, and *** for 










  Standard 
Error p-value Coefficient 
Standard 
Error p-value   
Intercept   -0.0792 0.0363 0.0298 0.0365 0.0307   -0.0351 0.0216 0.1044 
Firm Size   0.0043** 0.0014 0.0017 0.0017 0.0103   0.0019** 0.0008 0.0180 
Disrupt   0.0012 0.0074 0.8688 0.0060 0.8395   -0.0005 0.0044 0.9080 
Identity   0.0026 0.0109 0.8104 0.0081 0.7475   0.0015 0.0065 0.8197 
Account   -0.0039 0.0084 0.6449 0.0060 0.5166   -0.0054 0.0050 0.2838 
Payment   -0.0114 0.0087 0.1886 0.0108 0.2911   -0.0058 0.0052 0.2596 
Proprietary   0.0002 0.0097 0.9818 0.0071 0.9751   0.0020 0.0058 0.7263 
Hacktivism   0.0062 0.0109 0.5710 0.0050 0.2168   0.0064 0.0065 0.3222 
Crime   0.0012 0.0092 0.8973 0.0055 0.8302   0.0045 0.0055 0.4126 
First Party   -0.0091** 0.0062 0.1439 0.0046 0.0487   -0.0046 0.0037 0.2147 
First Hack   -0.0037 0.0049 0.4504 0.0036 0.3019   -0.0012 0.0029 0.6844 
Consumer Non Durables   -0.0098 0.0104 0.3484 0.0067 0.1442   -0.0099 0.0062 0.1121 
Durables and Manuft.   -0.0124 0.0097 0.2013 0.0082 0.1339   -0.0071 0.0058 0.2154 
Technology   -0.0154** 0.0077 0.0474 0.0064 0.0175   -0.0099** 0.0046 0.0307 
Telecom and TV   -0.0155* 0.0093 0.0986 0.0080 0.0540   -0.0080 0.0056 0.1492 
Wholesale and Retail   -0.0055 0.0093 0.5582 0.0077 0.4790   -0.0044 0.0055 0.4224 
Finance   -0.0188* 0.0079 0.0174 0.0103 0.0695   -0.0062 0.0047 0.1866 
Days Passed   -0.0011 0.0015 0.4554 0.0012 0.3440   -0.0007 0.0009 0.4174 
Trailing Events   -0.0017*** 0.0007 0.0146 0.0007 0.0091   -0.0013*** 0.0004 0.0027 
1997-2007   -0.0016 0.0061 0.7984 0.0067 0.8150   -0.0022 0.0036 0.5422 
Recession Window   -0.0109 0.0071 0.1254 0.0141 0.4411   -0.0007 0.0042 0.8761 
Number of Records   0.0003 0.0005 0.5771 0.0005 0.5459   -0.0001 0.0003 0.7902 
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Online Appendix B: Results using data set including confounded events 
 
Table B.1: Mean and median CAR by event day, including confounded events 
The mean and median abnormal and cumulative abnormal returns are presented by time period for the event 
window [-1, 1]. Abnormal returns are estimated from regression model 𝑅𝑖𝑡 =  𝛼𝑖 + ∑ 𝛽𝑖𝑗𝐹𝑗𝑡 +
∑ 𝛾𝑖𝑇𝐷𝑇
1
𝑇=−1 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 where 𝑅𝑖𝑡 is the excess return over the one month treasury bill rate on the security for 
event i on day t;  𝐹𝑗𝑡 are the excess returns on the market (𝑀𝐾𝑇𝑅𝐹), size (𝑆𝑀𝐵), value (𝐻𝑀𝐿), 
profitability(𝑅𝑀𝑊), and investment (𝐶𝑀𝐴) risk factors (Fama, 2015) for day t, DT is a dummy variable 
equal to one on day τ in the event window [-1, 1], and zero otherwise;  and 𝜀𝑖𝑡 is the error term. Abnormal 
returns are summed over the event window to compute cumulative abnormal returns. Significance of the 
means (medians) as determined by a two-tailed t-test (sign test) is highlighted with * for 10% level, ** for 
5% level, and *** for 1% level. 
 
  1997-2015 Overall     1997-2015 Excluding Recession   
  Mean p Median p   Mean p Median p 
CAR -0.0057** 0.0109 -0.0030* 0.0583  -0.0042*** 0.0094 -0.0029 0.1076 
t-1 -0.0012 0.2699 -0.0004 0.6266  -0.0005 0.6618 -0.0004 0.5657 
t=0 -0.0044*** 0.0001 -0.0032*** <.0001  -0.0042*** <.0001 -0.0031*** <.0001 
t+1 0.0000 0.9881 0.0007 0.7869   0.0005 0.6369 0.0000 1 
  1997-2007 
  Mean p Median p   Mean p Median p 
CAR -0.0048* 0.099 -0.0027 0.2684  -0.0051* 0.0892 -0.0022 0.4035 
t-1 -0.0029 0.2036 -0.0012 0.7985  -0.0022 0.3146 -0.0016 0.5159 
t=0 -0.0037** 0.0407 -0.0033** 0.0329  -0.0036* 0.0691 -0.0031* 0.0507 
t+1 0.0018 0.3062 -0.0005 0.7985   0.0007 0.7307 -0.0013 0.4035 
  2008-2015 
  Mean p Median p   Mean p Median p 
CAR -0.0062** 0.0495 -0.0030 0.1413  -0.0036** 0.0492 -0.0030 0.1879 
t-1 -0.0001 0.9074 -0.0004 0.7264  0.0006 0.5318 -0.0003 0.8838 
t=0 -0.0049*** 0.0012 -0.0032*** 0.0006  -0.0046*** 0.0002 -0.0032*** 0.0007 
t+1 -0.0012 0.5978 0.0011 0.5287   0.0003 0.7478 0.0010 0.5587 
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Table B.2: Mean and median CAR by characteristic and industry, including confounded events 
The mean and median cumulative abnormal return is presented by attack characteristic and industry. Abnormal returns are estimated from regression 
model 𝑅𝑖𝑡 =  𝛼𝑖 + ∑ 𝛽𝑖𝑗𝐹𝑗𝑡 + ∑ 𝛾𝑖𝑇𝐷𝑇
1
𝑇=−1 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 where 𝑅𝑖𝑡 is the excess return over the one month treasury bill rate on the security for event i on 
day t;  𝐹𝑗𝑡 are the excess returns on the market (𝑀𝐾𝑇𝑅𝐹), size (𝑆𝑀𝐵), value (𝐻𝑀𝐿), profitability(𝑅𝑀𝑊), and investment (𝐶𝑀𝐴) risk factors (Fama 
and French, 2015) for day t, DT is a dummy variable equal to one on day τ in the event window [-1, 1], and zero otherwise;  and 𝑒𝑖𝑡 is the error term. 
Abnormal returns are summed over the three-day event window [-1, 1] to compute cumulative abnormal returns. Significance of the means (medians) 
as determined by a two tailed t-test (sign test) is highlighted with * for 10% level, ** for 5% level, and *** for 1% level. 
  Overall   Excluding Recession 
  N Mean p Median p   N Mean p Median p 
Overall 342 -0.0057** 0.0109 -0.0030* 0.0583   303 -0.0042*** 0.0094 -0.0029 0.1076 
Disrupt 120 -0.0057* 0.0893 -0.0028 0.2352   103 -0.0039 0.1900 -0.0015 0.4307 
Information 168 -0.0088** 0.0171 -0.0041* 0.0757   153 -0.0069*** 0.0032 -0.0044* 0.0750 
Integrity 54 0.0042 0.2197 0.0021 0.8919   47 0.0037 0.2248 0.0021 0.7709 
Hacktivism 24 0.0011 0.7788 0.0016 0.8388   24 0.0011 0.7788 0.0016 0.8388 
State Sponsored 25 -0.0035 0.4319 -0.0032 0.6900   25 -0.0035 0.4319 -0.0032 0.6900 
Cybercrime 293 -0.0064** 0.0120 -0.0030** 0.0468   254 -0.0048*** 0.0096 -0.0030* 0.0900 
First Party at Fault 225 -0.0079** 0.0111 -0.0037** 0.0453   192 -0.0056*** 0.0060 -0.0036* 0.0967 
Third Party at Fault 117 -0.0014 0.5853 -0.0009 0.7117   111 -0.0018 0.5016 -0.0009 0.7044 
Account 56 -0.0026 0.4120 -0.0029 0.1409   52 -0.0038 0.2513 -0.0043 0.1263 
Identity 23 -0.0065 0.1646 0.0012 1.0000   19 -0.0023 0.5671 0.0013 0.6476 
Payment 66 -0.0146* 0.0804 -0.0045 0.2678   59 -0.0102** 0.0110 -0.0047 0.1925 
Proprietary 23 -0.0047 0.4224 -0.0044 1.0000   23 -0.0047 0.4224 -0.0044 1.0000 
Previously Hacked 159 -0.0028 0.1585 -0.0034 0.1124   143 -0.0027 0.1662 -0.0032 0.1807 
First Hack 183 -0.0082** 0.0312 -0.0025 0.3007   160 -0.0056** 0.0281 -0.0021 0.3846 
Consumer Non Durables 20 -0.0058 0.1859 -0.0086 0.2632   17 -0.0063 0.2200 -0.0092 0.3323 
Durables and Manuft. 29 -0.0041 0.4385 -0.0040 0.4583   28 -0.0046 0.3888 -0.0045 0.3449 
Technology 109 -0.0053* 0.0990 -0.0056* 0.0842   92 -0.0045 0.1504 -0.0048 0.2513 
Telecom and TV 33 -0.0021 0.6641 0.0012 1.0000   28 -0.0048 0.3468 -0.0010 1.0000 
Wholesale and Retail 34 -0.0068 0.1928 -0.0053 0.6076   32 -0.0088 0.1010 -0.0071 0.3771 
Finance 70 -0.0144* 0.0769 -0.0012 0.7202   66 -0.0047 0.2164 -0.0007 0.9022 
Other 47 0.0039 0.4108 0.0013 1.0000   40 0.0026 0.4695 0.0019 0.8746 
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Table B.3: Cross sectional regression of CAR, including confounded events 
Results are reported for a cross sectional regression of determinants of cumulative abnormal returns. CARs used are calculated using a Five Factor 
asset pricing model. Firm size is the natural logarithm of firm size (in thousands) on the day of the attack. Days passed is the natural logarithm of 
the number of calendar days since the last attack. Trailing events count the number of cyber-attacks on publicly traded companies in the last 30 
trading days. Number of records is the natural logarithm of the number of records lost in an attack. The remaining variables are dummies for the 
stated attack, industry, or time attribute. Results are shown for OLS estimates with ordinary and heteroscedasticity consistent standard errors. 
Robust regressions are conducted using the M-estimation method. Significance is highlighted with * for 10% level, ** for 5% level, and *** for 
















Error p-value Coefficient 
Standard 
Error p-value 
Intercept   -0.0486 0.0386 0.2087 0.0453 0.2840   -0.0259 0.0224 0.247 
Firm Size   0.0035* 0.0014 0.0167 0.0019 0.0653   0.0018** 0.0008 0.0309 
Disrupt   -0.0091 0.0079 0.2517 0.0080 0.2556   -0.0061 0.0046 0.1883 
Identity   0.0051 0.0114 0.6515 0.0137 0.7076   -0.0061 0.0066 0.3584 
Account   0.0015 0.0090 0.8681 0.0097 0.8783   -0.0075 0.0052 0.1529 
Payment   -0.0069 0.0096 0.4695 0.0103 0.4999   -0.0111** 0.0056 0.0453 
Proprietary   -0.0108 0.0107 0.3114 0.0079 0.1729   -0.0037 0.0062 0.5471 
Hacktivism   0.0038 0.0119 0.7469 0.0064 0.5497   0.0037 0.0069 0.5916 
Crime   -0.0046 0.0101 0.6509 0.0074 0.5326   0.0028 0.0059 0.6369 
First Party   -0.0078 0.0067 0.2493 0.0053 0.1401   -0.0063 0.0039 0.107 
First Hack   -0.0037 0.0052 0.4840 0.0042 0.3863   -0.0004 0.003 0.8891 
Consumer Non Durables   -0.0124* 0.0117 0.2892 0.0073 0.0918   -0.0085 0.0068 0.2096 
Durables and Manuft.   -0.0116 0.0106 0.2722 0.0075 0.1218   -0.009 0.0061 0.1415 
Technology   -0.0166** 0.0082 0.0453 0.0075 0.0269   -0.011** 0.0048 0.0214 
Telecom and TV   -0.0150* 0.0100 0.1345 0.0081 0.0642   -0.0083 0.0058 0.1513 
Wholesale and Retail   -0.0120 0.0100 0.2315 0.0094 0.2009   -0.0071 0.0058 0.2196 
Finance   -0.0277** 0.0085 0.0013 0.0129 0.0327   -0.0079 0.005 0.1131 
Days Passed   -0.0011 0.0016 0.4784 0.0017 0.5023   -0.0003 0.0009 0.7663 
Trailing Events   -0.0009 0.0007 0.2008 0.0006 0.1506   -0.0007* 0.0004 0.0838 
1997-2007   0.0031 0.0067 0.6417 0.0081 0.7011   -0.0012 0.0039 0.7531 
Recession Window   -0.0099 0.0076 0.1951 0.0144 0.4943   -0.0017 0.0044 0.6988 
Number of Records   -0.0015 0.0006 0.0131 0.0014 0.2772   -0.0002 0.0003 0.6194 
  41 
Online Appendix C: Miscellaneous 
Table C.1: Mean and Median CAR by Characteristic and Industry, 1997-2007 
The mean and median cumulative abnormal return is presented by attack characteristic and industry. Abnormal returns are estimated from regression model 
𝑅𝑖𝑡 =  𝛼𝑖 + ∑ 𝛽𝑖𝑗𝐹𝑗𝑡 + ∑ 𝛾𝑖𝑇𝐷𝑇
1
𝑇=−1 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 where 𝑅𝑖𝑡 is the excess return over the one month treasury bill rate on the security for event i on day t;  𝐹𝑗𝑡 are 
the excess returns on the market (𝑀𝐾𝑇𝑅𝐹), size (𝑆𝑀𝐵), value (𝐻𝑀𝐿), profitability(𝑅𝑀𝑊), and investment (𝐶𝑀𝐴) risk factors (Fama and French, 2015) 
for day t, DT is a dummy variable equal to one on day τ in the event window [-1, 1], and zero otherwise;  and 𝜀𝑖𝑡 is the error term. Abnormal returns are 
summed over the three-day event window [-1, 1] to compute cumulative abnormal returns. Significance of the means (medians) as determined by a two 
tailed t-test (sign test) is highlighted with * for 10% level, ** for 5% level, and *** for 1% level. 
    Overall     Excluding Recession 
  N Mean p Median p   N Mean p Median p 
Overall 126 -0.0075*** 0.0043 -0.0049* 0.0901   106 -0.0067** 0.0150 -0.0040 0.2065 
Disrupt 83 -0.0051* 0.0752 -0.0035 0.1875   75 -0.0053* 0.0744 -0.0029 0.2480 
Information 36 -0.0130** 0.0375 -0.0053 0.4050   28 -0.0115* 0.0900 -0.0059 0.5716 
Integrity 7 -0.0068 0.3649 -0.0072 1.0000   3 0.0035 0.6988 0.0048 1.0000 
Hacktivism 1 0.0164 . 0.0164 1.0000   1 0.0164 . 0.0164 1.0000 
State Sponsored 0 . . . .   0 . . . . 
Cybercrime 125 -0.0077*** 0.0036 -0.0049* 0.0732   105 -0.0069** 0.0126 -0.0044 0.1716 
First Party at Fault 51 -0.0117** 0.0156 -0.0060* 0.0919   35 -0.0116** 0.0368 -0.0060 0.1755 
Third Party at Fault 75 -0.0046 0.1185 -0.0013 0.4887   71 -0.0042 0.1667 -0.0009 0.6353 
Account 4 -0.0021 0.7199 -0.0037 0.6250   1 -0.0136 . -0.0136 1.0000 
Identity 6 -0.0110 0.3586 -0.0125 0.6875   3 -0.0038 0.8009 -0.0110 1.0000 
Payment 20 -0.0092 0.1671 0.0012 0.8238   18 -0.0048 0.2208 0.0012 0.8145 
Proprietary 4 -0.0281 0.2503 -0.0105 0.1250   4 -0.0281 0.2503 -0.0105 0.1250 
Previously Hacked 50 -0.0042 0.1868 -0.0048 0.1189   42 -0.0045 0.1511 -0.0040 0.1641 
First Hack 76 -0.0096** 0.0118 -0.0049 0.4222   64 -0.0081** 0.0468 -0.0031 0.7080 
Consumer Non Durables 10 -0.0035 0.5886 -0.0086 0.7539   8 -0.0034 0.6624 -0.0086 0.7266 
Durables and Manuft. 12 -0.0028 0.5157 -0.0022 0.7744   11 -0.0042 0.3515 -0.0035 0.5488 
Technology 48 -0.0129*** 0.0063 -0.0085** 0.0293   38 -0.0117** 0.0112 -0.0085* 0.0730 
Telecom and TV 18 -0.0120 0.1052 -0.0118 0.4807   16 -0.0124 0.1379 -0.0129 0.8036 
Wholesale and Retail 4 0.0107 0.2087 0.0123 0.6250   3 0.0098 0.4055 0.0113 1.0000 
Finance 24 -0.0027 0.7083 0.0012 0.8388   23 -0.0026 0.7294 0.0013 0.6776 
Other 10 -0.0014 0.8456 0.0009 1.0000   7 0.0061 0.1949 0.0031 1.0000 
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Table C.2: Mean and Median CAR by Characteristic and Industry, 2008-2015 
The mean and median cumulative abnormal return is presented by attack characteristic and industry. Abnormal returns are estimated from regression model 
𝑅𝑖𝑡 =  𝛼𝑖 + ∑ 𝛽𝑖𝑗𝐹𝑗𝑡 + ∑ 𝛾𝑖𝑇𝐷𝑇
1
𝑇=−1 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 where 𝑅𝑖𝑡 is the excess return over the one month treasury bill rate on the security for event i on day t;  𝐹𝑗𝑡 are 
the excess returns on the market (𝑀𝐾𝑇𝑅𝐹), size (𝑆𝑀𝐵), value (𝐻𝑀𝐿), profitability(𝑅𝑀𝑊), and investment (𝐶𝑀𝐴) risk factors (Fama and French, 2015) 
for day t, DT is a dummy variable equal to one on day τ in the event window [-1, 1], and zero otherwise;  and 𝜀𝑖𝑡 is the error term. Abnormal returns are 
summed over the three-day event window [-1, 1] to compute cumulative abnormal returns. Significance of the means (medians) as determined by a two 
tailed t-test (sign test) is highlighted with * for 10% level, ** for 5% level, and *** for 1% level. 
    Overall     Excluding Recession 
  N Mean p Median p   N Mean p Median p 
Overall 187 -0.0065** 0.0392 -0.0034 0.0403   171 -0.0050*** 0.0069 -0.0035** 0.0465 
Disrupt 27 -0.0064 0.1848 -0.0030 0.4421   20 -0.0039 0.3976 -0.0023 0.8238 
Information 120 -0.0080* 0.0876 -0.0041 0.0824   113 -0.0061** 0.0147 -0.0043 0.5940 
Integrity 40 -0.0019 0.4959 -0.0027 0.6358   38 -0.0022 0.4473 -0.0027 0.6271 
Hacktivism 21 0.0002 0.9571 0.0012 1.0000   21 0.0002 0.9571 0.0012 1.0000 
State Sponsored 25 -0.0059 0.1380 -0.0067 0.4244   25 -0.0059 0.1380 -0.0067 0.4244 
Cybercrime 141 -0.0076* 0.0618 -0.0035 0.0429   125 -0.0057** 0.0130 -0.0040** 0.0487 
First Party at Fault 157 -0.0069* 0.0618 -0.0032 0.1102   142 -0.0050** 0.0178 -0.0033 0.1534 
Third Party at Fault 30 -0.0044 0.2184 -0.0040 0.2005   29 -0.0050 0.1695 -0.0046 0.1360 
Account 45 -0.0063* 0.0735 -0.0053 0.0357   44 -0.0074** 0.0306 -0.0078** 0.0226 
Identity 15 -0.0010 0.8243 0.0029 0.3018   14 0.0025 0.4468 0.0032 0.1796 
Payment 42 -0.0160 0.2100 -0.0049 0.0884   37 -0.0109* 0.0625 -0.0050** 0.0470 
Proprietary 19 0.0003 0.9563 0.0070 0.6476   19 0.0003 0.9563 0.0070 0.6476 
Previously Hacked 93 -0.0025 0.2856 -0.0032 0.2997   86 -0.0024 0.2737 -0.0033 0.3318 
First Hack 94 -0.0105* 0.0733 -0.0040 0.0790   85 -0.0076** 0.0106 -0.0046* 0.0821 
Consumer Non Durables 11 -0.0125* 0.0643 -0.0124 0.2266   10 -0.0135* 0.0697 -0.0189 0.3438 
Durables and Manuft. 16 -0.0083 0.3277 -0.0073 0.4545   16 -0.0083 0.3277 -0.0073 0.4545 
Technology 49 -0.0017 0.5664 -0.0030 0.3916   43 0.0001 0.9752 -0.0017 0.7608 
Telecom and TV 13 0.0039 0.1839 0.0036 0.5811   11 0.0027 0.3951 0.0012 1.0000 
Wholesale and Retail 27 -0.0088 0.1188 -0.0095 0.2478   26 -0.0106* 0.0601 -0.0100 0.1686 
Finance 44 -0.0183 0.1022 -0.0033 0.1742   41 -0.0082* 0.0600 -0.0032 0.2110 
Other 27 0.0051 0.4805 0.0013 1.0000   24 -0.0002 0.9636 0.0003 1.0000 
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Table C.3: Pairwise F-Tests for Cross Sectional Regression Beta Coefficients 
Results of a hypothesis test for the equality of the listed pairs of regression coefficients are shown. Main regression results are shown in Table (7). 
Regression coefficients represent the mean cumulative abnormal return when experiencing a cyber-attack for each subgroup. Results using the 
traditional OLS model are given with F-test, while the HEC model results are given with a Chi-Square test. Results indicate a failure to reject 
equality for all pairs. 
Group 1 Group 2 F p-value Chi-Square p-value 
Hacktivism Crime 0.30 0.5833 0.99 0.3200 
Account Identity 0.42 0.5153 0.95 0.3309 
Account Payment 1.02 0.3139 0.73 0.3933 
Account Proprietary 0.15 0.7020 0.31 0.5774 
Identity Payment 2.05 0.1531 1.90 0.1678 
Identity Proprietary 0.03 0.8527 0.07 0.7916 
Payment Proprietary 1.08 0.2989 1.23 0.2680 
Consumer Non Durables Durables and Manuft. 0.06 0.8130 0.12 0.7295 
Consumer Non Durables Technology 0.35 0.5567 0.88 0.3484 
Consumer Non Durables Telecom and TV 0.28 0.5981 0.59 0.4406 
Consumer Non Durables Wholesale and Retail 0.14 0.7074 0.23 0.6283 
Consumer Non Durables Finance 0.83 0.3627 0.88 0.3489 
Durables and Manuft. Technology 0.13 0.7214 0.22 0.6428 
Durables and Manuft. Telecom and TV 0.09 0.7582 0.19 0.6627 
Durables and Manuft. Wholesale and Retail 0.41 0.5218 0.44 0.5055 
Durables and Manuft. Finance 0.49 0.4864 0.59 0.4437 
Technology Telecom and TV 0.00 0.9915 0.00 0.9890 
Technology Wholesale and Retail 1.26 0.2627 1.41 0.2345 
Technology Finance 0.26 0.6099 0.19 0.6651 
Telecom and TV Wholesale and Retail 0.93 0.3364 1.01 0.3154 
Telecom and TV Finance 0.16 0.6900 0.20 0.6529 
Retail Finance 2.53 0.1125 1.25 0.2631 
 
